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In the second half of 2007, financial turmoil swept over the U.s. and 
other major economies. Triggered by a subprime mortgage meltdown, the crisis 
quickly spread to other major financial markets and precipitated the worst eco-
nomic downturn since the Great depression. although financial and economic 
conditions have improved substantially, the wrenching episode’s effects are still 
with us.
during the crisis, financial markets experienced tremendous strains, 
and the cost of short-term funding rose sharply. The gap between the three-
month unsecured london interbank offered rate (libor) and the overnight in-
dexed swap (oIs) rate is frequently used as a measure of tensions in interbank 
money markets. as the crisis began in early august, this spread jumped from 
less than 0.1 percentage point to almost 1 percentage point within a month. at 
the crisis’s peak in september 2008—just after the collapse of lehman Brothers   	 EconomicLetter	 Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 2 	 Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
lending market’s breakdown rendered 
those tools inadequate for addressing 
the unusual financial market pressures 
during this crisis. 
Open-market operations are the 
Fed’s most powerful and frequently 
used policy tool, providing overnight 
credits at the federal funds rate. Every 
day, the Fed trades on the open mar-
ket with a select group of primary 
dealers, directly buying or selling 
Treasury or government agency securi-
ties or repurchase agreements against 
such securities. 
In normal times, primary deal-
ers distribute the liquidity increases to 
other financial institutions through the 
interbank money market, increasing 
the flow of credit to the overall econo-
my. In turbulent times, however, finan-
cial institutions are reluctant to lend to 
each other, and the channel can clog.
The discount window gives the 
Fed an alternative means of adding 
liquidity. Depository institutions in 
sound condition can obtain fully col-
lateralized overnight loans at an inter-
est rate that’s usually higher than the 
federal funds rate. 
From 2003 to the summer of 2007, 
the discount rate had been 100 basis 
points above the federal funds target. 
After the initial jump in money-market 
interest rates, the Fed narrowed the 
discount rate premium to 50 basis 
points on Aug. 17, 2007, and to 25 
basis points on March 17, 2008. The 
terms of discount window loans were 
extended to up to 30 days in August 
2007 and later to 90 days. The Fed 
also made the loans renewable at the 
request of the borrowers. 
These measures were taken to 
encourage banks to use the discount 
window, but the effects were modest 
due to the so-called stigma problem. 
During a financial crisis, banks may be 
reluctant to borrow from the discount 
window because of concerns that 
markets would interpret it as a sign of 
financial weakness. The stigma might 
damage their reputations, lower their 
market values and reduce their ability 
to borrow in the market.
and  the  rescue  of  American  Interna-
tional  Group—the  gap  soared  to  an 
unprecedented 3.7 percentage points.
The spikes in the Libor–OIS gap 
testify to the severity of a crisis that 
posed serious challenges to central 
banks around the world. In response, 
several of them created new lending 
facilities to quickly provide liquidity 
to the banking sector and improve 
market functioning. The list includes 
the European Central Bank, Bank of 
England, Bank of Canada and Swiss 
National Bank. On Dec. 12, 2007, the 
Federal Reserve established its ver-
sion—the term auction facility (TAF).  
Researchers have yet to reach 
a consensus on the effectiveness of 
such facilities. This Economic Letter, 
based on a recent study, provides an 
econometric evaluation of whether the 
TAF helped relieve strains in the U.S. 
money market.1 The findings reveal 
that the TAF has reduced liquidity risk 
premiums paid by banks; however, it 
has been less effective in cutting coun-
terparty risk premiums.
The Financial Crisis
The subprime mortgage market’s 
growing problems began to draw 
attention in early 2007. However, it 
took several months for the financial 
crisis to spread to money markets. On 
Aug. 9, 2007, French investment bank 
BNP Paribas halted redemptions from 
three of its subsidiary mutual funds, 
and in response, overnight interest 
rates shot up in Europe and the U.S.
The interbank money market 
is the main gateway for commercial 
banks to quickly obtain funding to 
make loans. Deteriorating condi-
tions greatly impaired the stability of 
this critical short-term funding and 
posed severe challenges to central 
banks’ ability to provide ample liquid-
ity through regular monetary policy 
channels.
Under normal circumstances, the 
Fed injects liquidity into the economy 
by two means—conducting open-mar-
ket operations and lending at the dis-
count window. However, the interbank 
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As strains in money markets 
persisted and worsened in early 
December 2007, the Fed established 
a new lending alternative—the term 
auction facility. Through this facil-
ity, the Fed auctioned preannounced 
amounts of credit, twice a month, 
to eligible depository institutions in 
sound financial condition for a term of 
one month instead of overnight.2 The 
TAF accepted the same kinds of collat-
eral as the discount window.
The TAF was initially set at $20 
billion for each auction. It was gradual-
ly increased to $150 billion in January 
2009 before it was scaled back. The 
final auction was held March 8, 2010.
After the TAF’s establishment, 
credit conditions in the interbank 
market improved significantly. The 
three-month Libor spread over the OIS 
rate dropped sharply from more than 
1 percentage point in early December 
2007 to less than 0.3 percentage 
point in late January 2008 (Chart 1). 
However, the spread widened again to 
about 0.8 percentage point in spring 
2008.
As macroeconomic and financial 
market conditions worsened substan-
tially in the second half of 2008, the 
spread jumped. The upswing and the 
later surge in Libor spreads raised 
doubts about the new liquidity facil-
ity’s effectiveness.3
To find out whether a liquid-
ity facility is working as intended, it’s 
important to understand the nature of 
the heightened strains on interbank 
money markets. During financial stress, 
banks become increasingly reluctant to 
lend to each other for two reasons. 
First, counterparty risk—the pos-
sibility that the institution on the other 
side of the transaction may default—
increases with the uncertainty about 
banks’ financial conditions. 
Second, banks tend to build up 
precautionary liquidity to guard against 
mounting uncertainty about the mar-
ket value of their assets—for instance, 
various structured credit products. In 
times of financial stress, funding to 
keep these assets on banks’ balance 
sheets is likely to become more costly 
and harder to obtain. Fund managers 
may also demand that extra liquidity 
be readily available to cover potential 
redemptions.4 
Through lending facilities to pro-
vide credit to financial institutions in 
need, the Fed and other central banks 
sought to relieve financial strains 
through several channels. 
The first and most direct channel 
involved providing additional funding 
to banks in immediate need of liquid-
ity, lowering short-term borrowing 
costs.5
The second channel focused on 
reducing the pressure on banks to 
liquidate assets, helping counteract 
upward pressure on banks’ funding 
costs from deterioration in money mar-
ket conditions. All else equal, this may 
contribute to a decline in counterparty 
risk. 
The third channel centered on 
strengthening confidence so that inves-
tors would demand less compensation 
for a given unit of risk—i.e., the price 
of risk may decline in the TAF’s pres-
ence. The risk premium—the product 
of the price per unit of risk and the 
perceived amount of risk—should also 
decline. 
The final channel entailed offering 
other readily available funding sources 
to discourage banks from excessively 
hoarding liquidity purely out of indi-
vidual precautionary concerns.
These channels provided reason 
to believe the TAF and other liquidity 
facilities might alleviate financial strains 
in the interbank money market.  
Quantifying TAF’s Effects 
Money market strains come from 
both the larger demand for liquidity 
during a financial crisis and heightened 
counterparty risk. I first examine the 
TAF’s effect by addressing these two 
concerns separately, and then quantify 
the TAF’s overall effect.
Reducing liquidity premiums. 
I focus on examining the TAF’s effect 
in relieving banks’ liquidity concerns 
by controlling for the variation in sys-
tematic counterparty risk premiums. 
Because measures of these premiums 
aren’t readily available, I construct one 
based on the observed credit default 
Chart 1
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swap (CDS) rates of major financial 
firms.
A CDS is a contract insuring 
against the default risk of a specific 
company. The CDS buyer makes peri-
odic payments to its seller, receiving 
full compensation for losses if the 
company defaults on its debt. The 
CDS rate can be viewed as an insur-
dollar Libor survey and use it as a 
proxy for the major banks’ systematic 
default risk premiums.
Chart 2 displays this systematic 
counterparty risk factor along with the 
individual CDS rates of several major 
banks included in the Libor survey. 
The constructed indicator captures the 
variations of individual CDS rates quite 
well, showing waves of volatility dur-
ing the crisis.
I then regress the Libor spreads 
on the constructed systematic counter-
party default risk factor and on a dum-
my variable that accounts for the TAF’s 
creation on Dec. 12, 2007. Estimation 
results from the two regressions indi-
cate that the TAF had effectively low-
ered major banks’ liquidity concerns by 
decreasing the three-month Libor–OIS 
spread about 26 basis points (Table 
1). This result is consistent with James 
McAndrews, Asani Sarkar and Zhenyu 
Wang’s estimates of TAF effects using 
different model specification.6
Counterparty default risk pre-
miums. Next, I evaluate the TAF’s 
effect on reducing systematic coun-
terparty default risk premiums. These 
premiums may depend on a variety 
of fundamental macroeconomic and 
financial variables—in particular, 
aggregate risks in the macroeconomy 
and financial markets. To capture this 
variable, I incorporate three measures 
of aggregate risk (Chart 3): 
• Merrill Lynch’s Merrill Option 
Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index to 
track the implied volatility in the lon-
ger-term U.S. Treasury market
• The Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) mea-
sure of implied volatility from options 
on the S&P 500 index to gauge the 
uncertainty in the stock market
• The implied volatility from 
three-month Eurodollar futures options 
to measure uncertainty regarding the 
near-term path of monetary policy
Given the central role of subprime 
mortgages in the most recent financial 
crisis, it’s necessary to control for their 
risks to more accurately determine the 
TAF’s effect. However, there are few 
ance premium, and a higher CDS rate 
means the market perceives a higher 
risk of default for the company. 
The CDS market quotes rates only 
for individual companies. To obtain a 
measure of overall or systematic coun-
terparty risk, I extract the first principal 
component of the individual five-year 
CDS rates for all 16 banks in the U.S. 
Table 1
TAF Lowers Liquidity Premiums
                                           Three-month Libor–OIS spread
Regression 1 Regression 2








Lag of Libor–OIS spread .9697**
(56.2749)
Adj. R2 .6037 .9881
NOTES: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey–West standard errors). * (**) denotes statistical signifi-
cance at the 5 percent (1 percent) level.
SOURCE: Author’s estimates. 
Chart 2
Credit Default Swap Premiums Gyrate During Crisis
Percentage points, annualized


















NOTES: The Libor CDS factor summarizes the five-year rates for the 16 banks in the Libor U.S. dollar survey. The Counterparty 
Risk Index is based on the average credit spread of five-year credit default swap contracts traded by 15 major financial firms.
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Chart 3
Evaluating Aggregate Risks in the Microeconomy and Financial Markets
Implied Volatility on Longer-Term Treasury Securities (MOVE Index) Implied Volatility on S&P 500 (VIX Index)
Percentage points, annualized Percentage points, annualized
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spreads, I construct a second mortgage 
default risk factor with a procedure 
similar to the one used for the vari-
able that tracks systematic counterparty 
default risk. 
This mortgage default risk factor 
is defined as the first principal com-
ponent of individual CDS rates for a 
group of the largest subprime mort-
gage lenders, mortgage bond insurers 
and residential construction companies. 
These firms represent sectors most 
heavily exposed to subprime mortgage 
market turmoil but have no access to 
the TAF. Therefore, their CDS rates are 
an ideal measure of financial markets’ 
perception of the underlying mortgage 
default risk.
Table 2 reports the TAF’s impact 
on CDS spreads of banks active in 
the Libor market. Results from two 
regressions suggest that uncertainties 
reflected in the Treasury bond market 
and mortgage default risk premiums 
are closely related to financial strains 
in the Libor market. Uncertainties 
about the stock market and near-term 
monetary policy actions have far less 
effect on the counterparty default risk 
premiums. 
At the same time, the TAF’s 
effect on counterparty default risk 
premiums is negligible. This indicates 
that the facility has been unable to 
significantly reduce counterparty 
default risk premiums among major 
commercial banks.
The TAF, however, was designed 
to alleviate liquidity premiums rather 
than address the insolvency risk that 
is reflected in CDS premiums.
As McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang 
point out, “The TAF is not expected 
to exert large or immediate effects in 
reducing credit risks of banks. Credit 
risks are largely determined by banks’ 
earnings and asset value. In the cur-
rent situation, it is likely that changes 
in asset values are the driving force 
for the credit risk of banks.
“Much of the change in banks’ 
asset values is determined by the 
valuation of mortgages and related 
financial products. Since the valua-
The TAF was designed
to alleviate liquidity 
premiums rather than 
address the insolvency 
risk that is reflected
in credit default
swap premiums.
readily available measures of these 
mortgage risks. For this reason, I use 
two alternative measures. 
The first is the seasonally adjusted 
average delinquency rate of residen-
tial mortgage loans owned by the 100 
largest U.S. commercial banks. This 
measures the portion of loans past due 
for 30 days or more on these banks’ 
balance sheets. A substantial rise in the 
delinquency rate would endanger the 
banks’ health and increase the prob-
ability of default. 
The average delinquency rate had 
been below 2 percent until first quarter 
2007, when it began to rise sharply, 
more than tripling to 6.9 percent in 
fourth quarter 2008. Since the onset 
of the financial crisis, a substantial rise 
in the delinquency rate has preceded 
almost every major spike in Libor–OIS 
spreads and counterparty default risk 
premiums, confirming that the wors-
ening mortgage situation was a major 
driver in the crisis.
However, the delinquency rate is 
available only quarterly with a six- to 
seven-week lag. To model daily Libor 
Table 2
TAF Offers Limited Relief from Counterparty Default Risk
                                           Systematic counterparty default risk factor





















Adj. R2 .8744 .8936
NOTES: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey–West standard errors). * (**) denotes statistical signifi-
cance at the 5 percent (1 percent) level.
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ket can’t be attributed to heightened 
uncertainty about the stock market or 
about the near-term course of mon-
etary policy.
Finally, estimation results again 
reveal that the TAF has a substan-
tial and statistically significant effect 
in narrowing the Libor–OIS spread. 
Controlled for various macroeco-
nomic and financial volatility and 
risk measures, the results show that 
the presence of the TAF on average 
reduced the three-month Libor–OIS 
spread by 50 or 55 basis points, 
depending on the proxy of mortgage 
risks used in the regression. 
The high adjusted R² values—85 
percent even without including CDS 
rates or the lagged Libor spread in 
the regression—indicate that these 
volatility and risk measures along 
with the TAF dummy account for 
most of the variation in Libor spreads.
TAF in Retrospect
Facing potentially dire conse-
quences from the financial crisis, 
several central banks established 
tion of mortgages is determined by 
the homeowners’ long-term ability to 
pay for their debt, there is no reason 
to expect the TAF to affect the value 
of banks’ mortgage and other assets.”7
TAF’s overall effect. Quanti-
fying the TAF’s broad impact on 
reducing money market strains com-
bines the lowering of both liquidity 
and counterparty risk premiums. For 
this purpose, I regress the three-
month Libor–OIS spread on the 
variables measuring macroeconomic 
and financial-market volatilities, the 
mortgage default risks and the TAF 
dummy.
The estimation’s results show 
that the implied volatility of longer-
term Treasury securities (MOVE) has 
a substantially positive and statisti-
cally significant effect on the Libor 
spreads (Table 3). A 1 percentage-
point increase in the MOVE index 
tends to increase the three-month 
Libor–OIS spread by almost 1 per-
centage point. 
Heightened mortgage risks have 
also contributed substantially to 
jumps in Libor spreads in the past 
two years. For instance, a 1 percent-
age-point rise in the delinquency rate 
tends to increase the three-month 
Libor spread by 24 basis points, and 
a 1 percentage-point rise in the CDS 
rates of mortgage firms increases the 
Libor spread by 6 basis points. 
  From mid-2007 to fourth quarter 
2008, the delinquency rate rose about 
4.5 percentage points, and mortgage 
CDS rates rose from less than 1 per-
cent to a peak of 16 percent, both 
suggesting that heightened mortgage 
risk alone has increased the Libor 
spread by about 1 percentage point. 
Such an effect is significant at the 1 
percent level.
The implied volatilities on the 
S&P 500 (VIX) and three-month 
Eurodollar futures options have much 
smaller influences on the Libor–OIS 
spread, and in most specifications, 
their coefficient estimates are statisti-
cally insignificant. This suggests that 
increased strains in the money mar-
Evidence indicates 
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Adj. R2 .8501 .8477
NOTES: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey–West standard errors). * (**) denotes statistical signifi-
cance at the 5 percent (1 percent) level.
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liquidity facilities designed to reduce 
financial stresses on the interbank 
money market. The Fed’s version was 
the term auction facility.
The TAF appears to have had 
only a limited effect in reduc-
ing counterparty risk premiums. 
However, evidence indicates that 
the facility was effective in reduc-
ing liquidity risk premiums paid by 
banks. 
Estimates indicate that the pres-
ence of the TAF lowered the three-
month Libor–OIS spread by 50 or 55 
basis points during the crisis of 2007–
09, mainly by addressing concerns 
about the banking sector’s liquidity.  
In 2010, the crisis has abated 
and financial markets are functioning 
normally. The TAF and other lend-
ing facilities established during the 
crisis were an experiment that proved 
effective in addressing severe finan-
cial turbulence, and similar facilities 
can be a useful part of the Federal 
Reserve’s tool kit in the event of 
future crises.
Wu is a senior economist and advisor in the 
Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.
Notes 
1 The study used is “The U.S. Money Market and 
the Term Auction Facility in the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2009,” by Tao Wu, The Review of Econom-
ics and Statistics, forthcoming.
2 Occasionally, the Federal Reserve also conducts 
auctions in anticipation of special needs for 
liquidity. For instance, several forward auctions 
were conducted to ease year-end pressures on 
the demand for liquidity in late 2008. The matu-
rity of the TAF loans in such cases can vary and is 
sometimes as long as 85 days.
3 See, for example, “A Black Swan in the Money 
Market,” by John B. Taylor and John C. Williams, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 
vol. 1, issue 1, 2009, pp. 58–83.
4 See note 1. These are concerns over funding 
liquidity; that is, the risk that an institution may be 
unable to raise cash to maintain its balance-sheet 
position. These are in contrast to concerns over 
trading liquidity, which refers to banks’ difficulties 
executing transactions at the prevailing market 
price due to a temporary lack of appetite for the 
transactions by other traders on the market.
5 See note 1.
6 See “The Effect of the Term Auction Facility on 
the London Interbank Offered Rate,” by James 
McAndrews, Asani Sarkar and Zhenyu Wang, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report 
no. 335, July 2008.
7 See note 6.